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Abstract: Foucault underlined, throughout his whole intellectual activity, the 
question of truth as an effect of power-knowledge. There are not properly truths as 
substances, but effects of truths as incorporeal practices of discourse, that change 
slowly, but inevitably, the limits of our knowledge. We can say then that he has 
always been a pragmatist, unbeknown to him. However, it was during the last two 
courses delivered at the Collége de France, recently published with the title of The 
Government of Self and Others and The Courage of Truth, that he recognized 
explicitly his pragmatic vein. I will show two specific points of his philosophical 
testament (as we can consider the two courses). Commenting Plato’s Seventh Letter, 
he said the philosophy coincides with “its practices” (pragmata). Philosophy is an 
ergon, a work, a labor, a practical and “real” activity, that must undergo the test of 
praxis (and of politics). Secondly, commenting Platos’ Lachetes and the Cynical 
attitude, he referred to the Greek Parrhesia, the will to speak freely. It has evidently 
a pragmatist imprint: the philosopher who serves to find the truth must manifest in 
his way of life a congruence, a tuning between bios and logos, gestures and 
meanings, between the body, with its bearings and manners, and the truth conveyed. 
The real correspondence is not between words and facts, but between words and 
actions. It is not, therefore, sufficient a truth be expressed by words: it must be 
acted. It must transform into habits, take form in a corporeal life, in an existence, in 
a praxis: this is the teaching not only of the pragmatist school, but also of the 
hermeneutical one starting from Nietzsche to the last Foucault. Philosophy must 
return to be a form of life, and to witness in practice its ideas. 
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Resumo: Foucault destacou, por toda sua atividade intelectual, a questão da 
verdade como um efeito do poder do saber. Não há propriamente verdades como 
substâncias, mas sim efeitos de verdades como práticas incorpóreas do discurso, 
que mudam de forma lenta, mas inevitável, os limites do nosso conhecimento. 
Podemos dizer, então, que ele sempre foi um pragmatista, sem ter consciência disso. 
Todavia, foi durante os dois últimos cursos ministrados no Collége de France, 
publicados recentemente sob os títulos de O Governo de Si e dos Outros e A 
Coragem da Verdade, que ele reconheceu explicitamente sua veia pragmática. 
Apresentarei dois pontos específicos de seu testamento filosófico (como podemos 
considerar os dois cursos). Comentando sobre A Sétima Carta de Platão, ele disse 
que a filosofia coincide com “suas práticas” (pragmata). A filosofia é um ergon, 
uma criação, um trabalho, uma atividade prática e “real” que deve submeter-se ao 
teste da práxis (e da política). Em segundo lugar, comentando Lachetes e as 
atitudes Cínicas de Platão, ele se referiu à Parrhesia grega, a vontade de falar 
livremente. Possui evidentemente uma marca pragmatista: o filósofo que se dedica 
à busca da verdade deve manifestar, em seu modo de vida, uma congruência, uma 
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afinação entre bios e logos, gestos e significados, entre o corpo, com seu porte e 
modos e a verdade transmitida. A correspondência real não está entre palavras e 
fatos, mas sim entre palavras e ações. Não é, portanto, suficiente que uma verdade 
seja expressa por palavras: precisa ser exercida. Deve se transformar em hábitos, 
assumir forma em uma vida corpórea, em uma existência, em uma práxis: este é o 
ensinamento não só da escola pragmatista, como também da hermenêutica, a partir 
de Nietzsche até o Foucault tardio. A filosofia deve voltar a ser uma forma de vida, 
e testemunhar na prática suas ideias. 
 
Palavras-chave: Foucault; Parrhesia, Platão, Sétima Carta. Cínicos. 
 
 
 
The word ‘truth’ has been the focus of Michel Foucault’s analyses since his first writings on 
the microphysics of power to his later works on the modalities of subjectivation in the Greek 
world. Foucault’s entire philosophical journey can be maybe read as an attempt to answer 
Nietzsche’s suggestive question in the aphorism 110 of The Gay Science: “How far is truth 
susceptible of embodiment—that is the question, that is the experiment” (NIETZSCHE, 
2001). In the first phase of his work, Foucault is the refined and insightful interpreter of those 
processes of subjection that issue the “truth” as the product of a ramified system of power-
knowledge, a system that defines the limits and criteria for distinguishing what is true from 
what is false. In the last phase (I will analyze some texts from this phase), truth is interpreted, 
to use Foucault’s own words, as the ‘reality’ of philosophy, as what puts to test philosophy’s 
validity.
2
 The ideas of proof and experiment, to be found not only in Nietzsche’s philosophy, 
but also in pragmatism, are recurrent in Foucault’s later texts. According to the famous phrase 
at the outset of The Use of Pleasure: 
 
The essay—which should be understood as the essay or test by which, in the 
game of truth, one undergoes change, and not as the simplistic appropriation 
of others for the purpose of communication—is the living substance of 
philosophy, at least if we assume that philosophy is still what it was in times 
past, i.e. an ascesis, an askesis, an exercise of oneself in the activity of 
thought (FOUCAULT, 1985a, p. 9). 
 
To this, I would add another striking passage from Nietzsche’s Gay Science in which we read 
“that life may be an experiment of the thinker—and not a duty, not a fatality, not a 
deceit!”(NIETZSCHE, 2001, § 324).3 
Therefore, the discourse on truth, as Foucault points out, is always tied to the 
discourse on the constitution of subjectivity. Yet, in his later writings, the subject is no longer 
seen as wholly dominated by precise power devices, but as capable of truthful speech; the 
subject is at the origin of practices of truth-telling, and of operations of veridiction, which 
both constitute her as such, and of which she is in control in virtue of the exercise of her 
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freedom.
4
 As a consequence, there are effects of truth produced by the active engagement of 
the subject in practices of self-constitution, capable to mold conduct and self-control. Even 
simply these latter words recall a possibility of inquiry that the pragmatists have pursued in all 
possible directions: the topics of truth and its effects, meanings and their explanation in terms 
of habits of response, are typical pragmatist topics and should be also associated to Foucault’s 
reflection.
5
 This thought, in both traditions, is articulated in the following way: philosophy 
should not only aim to ground the truth of discourse, but it should clarify what predictable and 
unpredictable acts would result from its concepts, in the sense of that dynamic that Foucault 
used to call ‘alethurgy’ (the work that produces truth). It is impossible to question truth as 
independent from the practices enacted to achieve truth. Both for the pragmatists and 
Foucault, philosophy has then an ethical and political efficacy: it aims to transform the 
individuals by endowing them with new powers on life, not simply by making them more 
knowledgeable through the acquisition of different types of knowledge on life. In Foucault’s 
terminology, the efficacy of philosophy is ethopoietic (habit-forming), not epistemic. 
Also the topic of parrhesia (“free-spokenness” or expressing oneself freely, without 
reserve, constraint or inhibition, even in the face of the powerful), on which Foucault reflects 
often in his later courses, should not be interpreted as the necessity to speak the truth, in 
epistemological or analytic sense, but as the “courage” to act upon what is truthfully held, to 
“work out” the effects of truth so understood. In this way, truth is no longer only speech but 
becomes pragma. This point is obviously related to the issue of the practices of truth, at the 
intersection among living praxes, ethical habits, and bodily dispositions through which 
knowledge is put to practice. In a similar way, Peirce writes that beliefs are measured in terms 
of habits, that is, in terms of what a human being is committed and ready to do (“that upon 
which he is prepared to act” [PEIRCE, 1998, p. 399]). From this definition, Pragmatism is 
scarce more than a corollary, he adds. 
In ancient Greece philosophizing was not an intellectual work, but a way to shape, or 
to embed a certain style to, one’s entire existence. By losing this horizon, we have created 
dichotomies between practice and theory, body and spirit, and we have started to believe that 
purely rational conceptual machineries are sufficient to truth. On the contrary, we have to 
rediscover once again the pragmatic matrix of the philosophical attitude and go back to the 
idea of philosophy as praxis, techne tou biou (HADOT, 1987). 
In order to defend the claim that Foucault proposes, at least in his later works, a form 
of pragmatism (however unaware of the topics and the problems of that doctrine), I will start 
to analyze Plato’s Seventh Letter, which is, as it is well known, the focus of his penultimate 
course at the Collége de France, The Government of Self and Others I (FOUCAULT 2010).
6
 
As is well known, Plato went to Sicily to convince the tyrant Dyonisios to govern with justice, 
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following his wise advices. And he failed. Plato’s key sentence, on which Foucault builds 
almost his entire discourse in the lectures of February 1983, is the following one: 
 
With these views and thus nerved to the task, I sailed from home, not in the 
spirit which some imagine, but principally through a feeling of shame with 
regard to myself, lest I might some day appear to myself wholly and solely a 
mere man of words (logos), one who would never of his own will lay his 
hand to any act (ergon) (PLATO, 1903, 328d). 
 
Plato faces three difficult trips to Syracuse, the storms, the risk of being imprisoned and sold 
as a slave, for a very compelling reason: as a philosopher, he must commit himself to a 
precise practice, he must show that he is not only one who produces logoi, but that he is also 
able to put those ideas into practice. There is no philosophy, says the father of philosophy, 
without this passion (epithymia) for the public and political life. The love of wisdom (philo-
sophia) and the force of power (dynamis politike, cf. 335d) must proceed together; that is, the 
politician needs the philosopher’s advice, and the philosopher has no other goal than 
providing the rulers of the city with a rigorous education. It is in this way that the philosopher 
must be capable of parrhesia.
7
 However—and here is a point that leads us immediately to 
pragmatism—speaking openly is interpreted as acting consistently and with conceivable 
practical effects: that is, there should be no gap between word and reality, logos and ergon, as 
it happens instead in the case of rhetoricians and sophists, unless we want the defeat of the 
real project and function of philo-sophia. In order to be capable of parrhesia, the logos has to 
become ergon. According to Foucault, this point clarifies how philosophy should not be 
conceived simply as mathesis, that is knowledge and communication of knowledge, but as 
askesis, as repeated exercise leading to pragmata, to more adequate philosophical and 
political habits.
8
 
Philosophy is for the Greeks first and foremost a way of life, a way of being, a certain 
practical relation to one’s self,9 through which one’s life and other people’s lives are 
poietically constituted (in accordance with the principle that the philosophical life ought to be 
lived in koinonia, in a community). Philosophy is parrhesia as long as it is a practice of truth-
telling: however, it finds what is true not through logico-analytical arguments (trying to state 
how things are), but through life itself and its practices (trying to live consistently what is held 
to be true, the content of one’s beliefs). Truth becomes not a logical, but an ethical product: it 
is not mirrored in the logoi, but in actual conduct. Under what conditions is then possible to 
speak of a truthful subject, capable of veridiction? This is the topic of the two volumes of The 
Government of Self and Others, which show how at the center of Foucault’s analyses there is 
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always the strict link between subject and truth,
10
 although articulated in a different way from 
the writings of the ‘70s. Here we see the syntony with Plato’s political, in a wide sense, 
conception of philosophy: philosophy is a spark started in the soul and fed by “much converse 
about the matter itself and a life lived together” (341d); it is never the abstract or intellectual 
articulation of mere theories. Logos is complete only if it is capable to lead us to a practical 
transformation, to a precise ergon: “By their fruits ye shall know them” (PEIRCE, 1998, 
p.401), wrote Peirce about his pragmatic maxim. Plato would have said the same most likely 
when his trireme was leaving Athens. 
The point, then, is not how thought corresponds to reality, but how it acts in reality. 
But how should we translate the word ergon? Foucault uses the word réel, which is usually 
translated into English with “work”, but also with “reality”, or “action”. The Greek word 
means the practical fact, the duty, the work, the execution, the enterprise, the occupation, all 
aspects related to the “doing”. Logo kai ergo is Homer’s famous phrase with which it is 
claimed “in words and facts” that things went in a certain way. The power of this hendiadys is 
strongly diminished when one of the two terms is used without the other. 
As I was saying, Foucault interprets the term ergon as the central expression around 
which the semantic variations of the words of philosophy, present in the Seventh Letter, 
gravitate. Most importantly, he associates ergon to pragma. Foucault’s problem is here the 
political implication of philosophy, its function in “reality”. What is the job of the 
philosopher? What do we do when we do philosophy? Aristophanes is maybe right when he 
claims that philosophers are pale beings, involved in their own nonsense, always with their 
heads up in the clouds? No: Plato’s concern was the political life of his city, the government 
and transformation of human beings, the edification of the kallipolis, the just and beautiful 
city. Philosophy has an integral political and civil aspiration. For this reason, the function of 
showing to the ruler, the prince, the tyrant, in what the philosophical work consists becomes 
crucial. Let me quote a relevant passage: “one must show such people, these tyrants, what to 
pragma is; through what activities, what practices and what effort it involves and 
presupposes” (FOUCAULT, 2010, p. 238). Foucault, then, interprets in pragmatistic terms 
Plato’s teaching. His question has a pragmatistic tone: what is the practical effectiveness of 
philosophy? What is the function of the philosophical practice, if it is not useless, if it has a 
force (dynamis) that is measured in terms of its effects of truth? Foucault answers (with Plato) 
that problematizing philosophy means to wonder what is its work, its reality. The reality of 
philosophy is the practices of philosophy, its pragmata. The topic is not, then, that of the 
theories that it produces, but that of the philosophical practice, that is, of the philosophical 
life.
11
 This practice is articulated into those pragmata that require a demanding and hard work 
of construction of the philosophical subject: practices of memorization, listening, questioning, 
debating, and giving and asking for arguments. These actual practices orient towards a very 
specific style of life, far from being removed from the political life of the city; it is a practice 
resistant to any attempt of subjugation, “a practice which finds its function of truth in the 
criticism of illusion, deception, trickery, and flattery” (FOUCAULT, 2010, p. 354).12 
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Philosophy is not mere contemplation, but askesis,
13
 continuous exercise in which we shape 
ourselves and the world. Practice, then, should be understood as a plural word.  
 
Philosophy is its practice. More exactly […] the reality of philosophy is not 
its practice as the practice of logos. That is to say, the reality of philosophy 
will not be its practice as discourse, or even as dialogue. It will be the 
practice of philosophy as ‘practices’, in the plural; the practice of philosophy 
in its practices, its exercises (FOUCAULT, 2010, p. 242). 
 
What is at stake in these exercises? Well, quite simply, it is the subject itself.  
 
That is to say, it is in the relation to self, in the work of self on self, in the 
work on oneself, in this mode of activity of self on self that philosophy’s 
reality will actually be demonstrated and attested. Philosophy finds its reality 
in the practice of philosophy understood as the set of practices through 
which the subject has a relationship to itself, elaborates itself, and works on 
itself. The reality of philosophy is this work of self on self (FOUCAULT, 
2010, p. 242).  
 
Foucault addresses here a topic that proves to be very important for his later reflections: the 
problem of the exercises through which the subject operates on herself in order to have access 
to truth, to become capable of “alethurgy.” Contrary to what the Christian Medieval thought 
first and the Cartesian thought later have made us believe, the truth of the subject neither 
reveals itself through introspection, as if it were a secret to be subtracted to the innermost 
recesses of one’s I; nor the truth of the object is conquered as a prey. The truth of the subject 
is constituted through construction, as an architectonic work, through the ethopoietics of the 
self. The most fundamental question for a philosopher is not “Who am I?”, but “What should 
I do with my life?”, “How can I transform myself?”, “What can I do of myself and of my 
relationships with other human beings?” Foucault highlights how Western thought has made 
two roads available: one is the metaphysics of the soul, centered on the psyche and on the 
Socratic “know thyself”; the other one is that of the ethics (and aesthetics) of existence, 
grounded on the epimeleia, on the care of one’s self, and on the techne tou biou.14 Also this 
second option is owed to Socrates, but maybe, remarks Foucault, to the Socrates of the Laches 
rather than to that of the Alcibiades. This latter option, which has eventually been the losing 
option in the Western tradition, is nevertheless extremely vivid and alive in Foucault’s later 
works, where we read words such as: “The idea of the bios as a material for an aesthetic piece 
of art is something which fascinates me.” (FOUCAULT, 1983). It is necessary, then, to 
resurrect the idea of subjectivity as a complex technical construction rather than as a solid 
kernel that needs to be reached and manifested in its primitive nature. It is no accident that in 
the Lecture of the 12 January, by reflecting on some themes already present in The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault aims at the “analysis of the pragmatics of the subject 
and techniques of the self” (FOUCAULT, 2010, p.42), or, definitely, at a “pragmatics of the 
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self” (ivi, p. 5). This pragmatics is expressed in “focal points of experience” (ivi, p.3), in 
forms of life, conducts, linguistic, and practical acts. 
Philosophy is therefore a praxis with very precise features: the work on one’s self; the 
relationships, born out of long, shared discussions, with good friends; and the life in synousia 
(being-with), as Plato himself wrote (PLATO, 1903, 324d). Although a long discussion of the 
problem of writing in Plato would lead us astray, it is certainly worth noticing that the 
practice of writing ends up ruining the condition of synousia—of meeting, conjunction, co-
habitation, and total friendship—that only makes the eros of philosophy possible. “There 
neither is nor ever will be a treatise of mine on the subject [the nature of philosophy]. For it 
does not admit of exposition like other branches of knowledge”, wrote Plato (341d). Written 
words are dead: the tyrant Dionysius has written down the ideas that Plato shared with him 
and in so doing he has made them die miserably. For philosophy is essentially, according to 
Plato and Foucault, interpellation. There is only one brief mention of this discussion in 
Foucault’s text, but I would stress it more strongly. “I think that ancient philosophy is also a 
parrhesia in a third way, in the sense that it is a perpetual interpellation addressed, 
collectively or individually, to persons, private individuals” (FOUCAULT, 2010, p.345). 
Philosophy has an allocutionary force, writes Foucault (FOUCAULT, 2010, p.350),
15
 in a 
way that, either it finds the power of addressing its community or it will die hopelessly. 
Philosophy has to establish a circle of listening: there is no solitary philosophy, and there is 
no philosophy that is not aimed, to some extent, to convince and generate effects. Speech acts 
are always, in a certain sense, performative: they cause a reaction and demand an answer. 
They expect to be listened to and invite to an understanding which is both hermeneutical and 
pragmatic; speech should be understood as a gesture indicating something to do. But if 
ancient philosophy wants to find in this allocutionary function a power of parrhesia, capable 
of determining a righteous conduct, modern and contemporary philosophy privileges a 
conception of speech as a questioning (mainly written and epistemologically oriented) on 
being and knowledge. 
I believe that the interpretation of philosophy as practical, ethical, and ascetical 
activity
16
 that Foucault proposes in these later courses is deeply pragmatic. Let us read the 
following simple quotation: “ascesis is the fashioning of accepted discourses, recognized as 
true, into rational principles of action” (FOUCAULT, 2005, p. 529).17 Peirce expressed a very 
similar insight, referring to the exercises (ascesis) and the habit-forming capacity that 
constitute the true final meaning:  
 
The deliberately formed habit, self-analyzing habit,—self-analyzing because 
formed by the aid of analysis of the exercises that nourished it,—is the living 
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definition, the veritable and final logical interpretant. Consequently, the most 
perfect account of a concept that words can convey will consist in a 
description of the habit which that concept is calculated to produce. But how 
otherwise can a habit be described than by a description of the kind of action 
to which it gives rise, with the specification of the conditions and the 
motive? (PEIRCE, 1998, p.  418). 
 
Philosophy understood in an ascetic-pragmatic way must translate logos into action in order 
to embody the knowledge in efficacious habits of response, capable of transforming our way 
to live and see the world. Or, in Gros’ words: “For Foucault then, truth is not displayed in the 
calm element of discourse, like a distant and correct echo of the real. It is, in the most 
accurate and literal sense of the expression, a reason for living, a logos actualized in 
existence, which sustains, intensifies, and tests it: which verifies it” (GROS in FOUCAULT, 
2005, p.529).  
In Foucault’s long production we can appreciate a shift from a focus on the subject, 
understood as being subject to certain practices, to a focus on the subject as the subject of 
certain practices (the care of the self, the self-knowledge), which becomes in the last two 
courses an almost exclusive attention to the practices themselves, through which a 
philosophical subjectivity is constituted at work. 
In this case, the “conceptual personae” (to use Deleuze’s expression) preferred by the 
late Foucault are the cynics. 
The cynic philosopher makes his appearance in Foucault’s course of 1984,18 the one 
that preceded immediately Foucault’s death and that was interrupted for his health issues. We 
are faced here with a type of philosopher totally different from the one of the tradition, in 
particular the Platonic tradition: while Plato works at the psychagogy, the guidance and 
conduction of the soul of the prince, through discourses and friendship, the cynic lives the 
philosophical testimony as an act of criticism and resistance to the power, a power which is 
ineradicable and that cannot be gained to the just and good thinking, but needs to be 
obstinately opposed. What is extremely appealing to Foucault is that the cynic philosophizes 
with his own body and behavior. No doctrine; his philosophy is made of actions, gestures, 
words used as weapons against his audience, including edgy behaviors. The life of the cynic – 
conducted in an elementary way—is philosophy in actu. These are the most advanced 
horizons of ethics. The ethos is bio-poietic (life-forming, cf. FABBRICHESI, 2015) and has 
no words to express itself doctrinally or speeches to convince. The cynic privileges the “short 
road” towards truth: he does not speak the truth, but he shows it in his own way of life, “in his 
gestures, in his frugality, in his renounces, in his ascesis”, in to pragma autò. This is a mute 
road: it speaks through deeds. This is why it is more arduous and demanding. Parrhesia 
becomes with the cynics an absolute form of exteriorization, of challenge and often of 
madness. Zeno was said to be a “Socrates gone mad”. Certainly, the cynics radicalized the 
Socratic teachings to the point of turning them into something different. 
Let me remind you briefly some anecdotes regarding the cynics. These philosophers 
with no school or doctrinal principles pursued an elementary style of life: a mat for bed, their 
own hands for plate, only a cape for clothing and sleeping, gestures and few words for 
communicating, no writings. The cynic has no birthplace, no home, no personal belongings: 
he is a militant opponent of property and maintains a complete indifference for what human 
beings usually value. His life is led in a semianimal fashion, obtained through a progressive 
                                                        
18
 Yet, these conceptual ‘personae’ were already present in the previous course, The government of Self and 
Others 1982-1983, and there were hints on that issue also in the Hermeneutics of the Subject. 
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and constant renounce. The cynic, according to Foucault’s famous saying, se de-prendre.19 He 
exercises practices of subtraction and resistance and attempts to leave no room for any type of 
dependency on power: his epoché, his purification, writes Gros, is a sort of “practical 
equivalent of the cogito” (GROS, 2011, p. 69). 
The bios philosophikos, the philosophical life, is also for the cynics a manifestation of 
truth, an alethurgy, as it is for the Plato of the Seventh Letter. But here the cynics propose a 
more radical interpretation: it is in the repeated gestures of their edgy style of life, in their 
everyday deeds that they become “the visible theater of truth” (FOUCAULT, 2011, p. 183). 
The cynic chooses a dramatization of existence (drama, acting). “In his life he is the manifest 
truth” (Ivi, p. 347). It exhibits an aesthetics (in the sense of sensible manifestation) rather than 
an ethics of truth. No logoi, just erga. What does this mean? Foucault sees in the cynics the 
embodiment of a principle that he takes to be fundamental: it is life itself that produces truth, 
not truth the aspiration of life. The parrhesia of the cynic is made authentic by his life and 
conduct. His body is “the visible figure of a truth which attracts. He is the physical model 
itself of the truth” (FOUCAULT, 2011, p. 310). His body in action, his performance, is the 
surface of inscription of events and concepts. It is the “picture”, the sculpture of truth. The 
cynics are, in Nietzsche’s terminology, super-men, as opposed to the “last men” who only 
want warmth, goods, and pleasures.
20
 Their parrhesia is without shame or fear; it is daring 
and brave and can sometimes become intolerable insolence. “He has suffered, endured, and 
deprived himself so that the truth takes shape in his own life, as it were, in his own existence, 
his own body”(FOUCAULT, 2011, p. 173). The cynic is “martyr of the truth”: 
 
testimony given, manifested, and authenticated by an existence, a form of 
life in the most concrete and material sense of the word; bearing witness to 
the truth by and in one’s body, dress, mode of comportment, way of acting, 
reacting, and conducting oneself. The very body of the truth is made visible, 
and laughable, in a certain style of life […] The true life as life of truth 
(FOUCAULT, 2011, p. 310). 
 
Their bios philosophikos is therefore a plane of pure immanence: the cynics’ body is one with 
the body of truth. They do not get ready for the other life, that life that would supposedly 
consist in the contemplation of the ideas; they pragmatically give form to another kind of life 
(vie autre), here and now. However, Foucault finds a similar approach already present in the 
Socrates of the Laches.
21
 For Laches says that he does not go to Socrates for learning his 
doctrine, but for imitating his behaviors. Socrates should be praised not for what he says, but 
for how he behaves; his life is an example of a perfect harmony and symphony of saying and 
doing, of logos and bios, of speech and conduct. This is why he can be an example for the 
young. Socrates is mousikos aner, a musical man. Also the cynics are musical, in the sense 
that they make their beliefs sound in the cords of their own existences: but their music is 
cacophonic, it is a screeching that hits you like a punch in the face. Nevertheless, their 
behavior is eloquent: it implies an analogy between the body, with its movements and 
attitudes, and the concept held. There has to be homophony between what one says and how 
one lives.
22
 There has to be a pedagogy based not on what one knows but on how one is. A 
                                                        
19
 Cf. Introduction to FOUCAULT, 1985a.  It means an active exercise of continual disassembling, de-tachment 
of the self from the self itself. 
20
 F. Nietzsche. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. ed. By. W. Kaufmann. New York: Viking Press, 1976, Prologue. Cf. 
The Courage of the Truth, lessons of the 22 February 1984, 1
st
 and 2
nd
 hour. 
21
 Cf. The Courage of the Truth, FOUCAULT, 2011, lessons of the 22 February 1984, 1
st
 and 2
nd
 hour. 
22
 The actual Pope, Jorge Maria Bergoglio often speaks of parrhesia in this sense, and has introduced the 
principle in his daily way of life. So did Nelson Mandela, and others (few) political leaders. Anybody can 
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practical, pragmatic, and anti-intellectualist pedagogy (just as Dewey taught). If gestures are 
“the visible theater of truth”, truth  becomes in this way ‘corporeal’. Foucault used to speak of 
a “materialism of the incorporeal” (FOUCAULT, 1981), but we could complete his 
terminology by speaking also of a “spiritualism of the corporeal”, in order to state that there is 
a “homogeneity” (JAMES, 1967, p. 188) between body and soul, thoughts and actions. 
We realize that the material and the immaterial are intertwined and merged together, if 
we think of how we transform through every action our knowledge into pragmatic habits of 
response; how we embody our beliefs in the certainty of our praxis; how we translate the 
incorporeal into the corporeal, meanings into gestures, the forms of speech into forms of life. 
The subject capable of parrhesia, evoked in Foucault’s later courses, is simply the subject 
who has learnt to embody the truth, as Nietzsche indicated in our first quote, and to run 
together thought and life. In this light, truth is not known if it is not practiced (if it is not 
stated, repeated, written, translated into a know-how and into an attitude to respond), that is, if 
logos does not become ethos, ethopoietic and biopoietic conduct constituted on the basis of a 
rigorous and disciplined askesis. 
It seems to me that this is an extremely pragmatistic approach. Maybe Foucault, as 
Wittgenstein, could have said: “So I am trying to say something that sounds as Pragmatism” 
(WITTGENSTEIN, 1975, § 422) by adding, however, just like the Austrian author suggested: 
but I do not want to affiliate my thought with any Weltanschaaung. 
Paraphrasing James, I could conclude by saying that the late Foucault is a radical 
pragmatist: there is philosophy only if there is a practice of transformation, of change, of work 
on one’s self (and therefore on the other); if the interpretation is not defined as a state of mind 
or of consciousness, but as a practical activity, a being ready to act. Even genealogy seems 
too speculative at this stage. Foucault’s interest in his late courses is life: the topic of the true 
life, of the other life (vie autre), and not of the other world, a life which, in its constituting 
and exhibiting itself, in its immanent flow, must be a plane of truth. With Socrates, the old 
Plato and the cynics (but Foucault adds also Spinoza, Montaigne, Pascal to the list) the topic 
of philosophical practice becomes fundamental. If is necessary to become aware of how 
“philosophy cannot be separated from a philosophical existence, that the practice of 
philosophy must always be more or less a sort of life exercise. This is what distinguishes 
philosophy from science” (FOUCAULT, 2011, p. 235). Instead of becoming slaves of the 
methods and instruments of science, we should reclaim this character of philosophy with 
insistence: the subject-matter of philosophy is the matter of the pragmatic agency of the 
philosopher, of his choices, of his newly invented practices, of his gestures of resistance. This 
is why Foucault, following Nietzsche, comes to believe in the fundamental value of the 
character, the daimon of the philosopher. I add this last notion in order to conclude with one 
of Heraclitus’s fragments, in which we can certainly read the spirit of the late Foucault: 
“Ethos anthropoi daimon”.23 
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